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One of the most significant administrative law cases, Chevron v. 
Natural Resources Defense Council, lnc.,1 is routinely referred to as 
the "counter-Marbury."2 The reference suggests that Chevron's com­
mand to courts to defer to certain reasonable agency interpretations of 
statutes is superficially an uneasy fit with the declaration in Marbury v. 
Madison that "[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial 
department to say what the law is."3 According to the consensus view, 
Chevron deference is consistent with Marbury, as long as Congress has 
delegated to agencies the power to make policy by interpreting am­
biguous statutory language or filling gaps in regulatory laws.4 In saying 
what the law is, courts determine that the law demands deference to 
the agency's decision. As Henry Monaghan wrote before Chevron: "A 
statement that judicial deference is mandated to an administrative 
'interpretation' of a statute is more appropriately understood as a 
judicial conclusion that some substantive law-making authority has 
been conferred upon the agency."5 His use of the passive tense here 
* Professor of Law, University of Southern California. B.A. 1985, University of Okla­
homa; J.D. 1988, University of Virginia. - Ed. I appreciate helpful comments from Rachel 
Barkow, Jody Freeman, Andrei Marmor, Tom Merrill, Eric Posner, Cass Sunstein, and 
Adrian Vermeule, and conversations with Linda Cohen, Barry Friedman, Dennis 
Hutchinson, and Jim Rossi. 
1. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
2. For perhaps the first such reference, see Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration 
After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2075 (1990) [hereinafter Sunstein, Law and 
Administration After Chevron]. See also Jim Rossi, Respecting Deference: Conceptualizing 
Skidmore Within the A rchitecture of Chevron, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1105, 1108 (2001) 
(stating Chevron "has taken on canonical status as the 'counter-Marbury' for the administra­
tive state"). 
3. 5 U.S. (1Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
4. See, e.g., David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron's Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 
SUP. Cr. REV. 201, 215 (2002); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Why Deference?: Implied Dele­
gations, Agency Expertise, and the Misplaced Legacy of Skidmore, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 735, 
746-47 (2002); Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 
833, 863 (2001). A very few scholars resist the notion that congressional delegation can solve 
the Marbury problem apparently caused when courts are not the primary interpreters of the 
law. See, e.g. , Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the 
Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 477 (1989); see also LOUIS L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL 
CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 563 (1965) (twenty years before Chevron, discuss­
ing judicial deference to agency interpretations and noting that the propriety of the practice 
"assumes, of course, that under our system of law an agency may not only apply rules but 
may make them"). This Symposium will no doubt shed new light on this debate. 
5. Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 6 
(1983); see also Kenneth A Bamberger, Provisional Precedent: Protecting Flexibility in 
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could obscure one important part of his formulation: It is Congress 
that has conferred such lawmaking power on the agencies; thus, judi­
cial deference stems from an understanding that it is emphatically the 
province and duty of the legislative department to determine whether 
agencies or the courts should determine policy by interpreting 
statutes.6 
Congressional delegation is important not just to reconcile modern 
administrative law with Marbury; it is also the reason provided by 
courts to justify strong deference to agency interpretations of law. 
Chevron held that 
[i]f Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an ex­
press delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provi­
sion of the statute by regulation .. . .  Sometimes the legislative delegation 
to an agency on a particular question is implicit rather than explicit. In 
such a case, a court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory 
provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an 
agency. 7 
Although it cut back on the scope of Chevron, United States v. Mead 
Corp.8 underscored that strong judicial deference is a product of either 
an explicit or implicit delegation by Congress.9 In the first Part of this 
Article, I discuss the various ways courts have reached decisions about 
the delegation issue and provide a brief assessment. 
In the end, none of the judicial methods to determine whether 
Congress actually delegated law-interpreting authority to agencies can 
satisfactorily achieve that objective. Without explicit congressional 
direction regarding which institution, courts or agencies, should have 
the primary role in interpreting statutes, the institutional choice is 
necessarily made by courts when they decide cases that require such 
interpretation. Although they tend to justify their decisions by refer­
ence to congressional intent, in the absence of such intent or without 
effective methods to ascertain it, the judicial branch decides whether 
or not to defer to agencies based on judges' views of policy, institu-
Administrative Policymaking, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1272, 1282 (2002) ("Chevron explicitly in­
volved fundamental constitutional doctrines governing relations among the governmental 
branches."); John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency In­
terpretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 621-22, 627 (1996) (using Monaghan's 
analysis to reconcile Marbury and Chevron). 
6. See Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV: 
L. REV. 2086, 2129-31 (2002) (arguing that Chevron, when viewed as a rule of interpretation, 
can be changed or eliminated by Congress because the Chevron canon is a "starting-point 
rule," but suggesting that Congress may be limited in how much deference to agency inter­
pretations it can demand from the courts given the nondelegation doctrine). 
7. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44. 
8. 533 U.S. 218 (2001). 
9. Mead, 533 U.S. at 229. For a discussion of Mead and its shift from Chevron, see infra 
text accompanying notes 39-43. 
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tional competence, and other factors. Some scholars have argued that, 
if the decision has been effectively left to the courts, judges should 
devise and consistently apply a general rule of construction of regula­
tory statutes based on an explicit consideration of the institutional 
capacities of courts and agencies.1 0  Recourse to congressional intent 
is inevitably unavailing, the argument goes, so courts should more 
transparently base their approach on other factors. 
My project in this Article is not to argue in favor of a particular 
rule of judicial review but rather to focus on a feature common to all 
of them. Whether courts search for some direction from Congress or 
whether they allocate interpretive authority based on other factors, all 
methods of judicial review provide that a clear congressional instruc­
tion overrides any judicial rule. As Thomas Merrill and Kristin 
Hickman explain: 
The conclusion that Chevron rests on an implied delegation from Con­
gress . . .  has important implications for Chevron's domain: It means that 
Congress has ultimate authority over the scope of the Chevron doctrine, 
and that courts should attend carefully to the signals Congress sends 
about its interpretative wishes. 11 
Similarly, those who argue in favor of a consistently applied interpre­
tive regime based on institutional, nonintentionalist grounds anticipate 
that "clear instructions of Congress"12 can vary the effect of the 
default. Why hasn't Congress more often taken advantage of this 
power to signal its intentions clearly? Does its silence allow us to 
assume that Congress virtually always agrees with the judicial 
approach in these cases? Are the procedural hurdles faced by 
Congress in passing legislation with clear directives to courts and 
agencies so formidable that the opt-out features in all the judicial 
approaches are illusory?13 Are we sufficiently confident that Congress 
has a realistic opportunity to communicate clearly when it wishes to 
depart from whatever approach the courts are currently applying? If 
10. See Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 MICH. 
L. REV. 885 (2003) (arguing in favor of an institutional approach). 
1 1 .  Merrill & Hickman, supra note 4, at 836; see also Thomas W. Merrill, The Mead 
Doctrine: Rules and Standards, Meta-Rules and Meta-Standards, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 807, 823 
(2002) [hereinafter Merrill, The Mead Doctrine] (explaining that "Christensen [v. Harris 
County, 529 U.S. 576 (2000)] and Mead make it clear that Congress has the authority to turn 
Chevron deference on and off"). 
12. Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 10, at 926; see also Einer Elhauge, Preference­
Estimating Statutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 2027, 2126-48 (2002) Uustifying 
Chevron as a default rule of statutory interpretation because it allows courts to better ap­
proximate current enactable political preferences and thereby to minimize political dissatis­
faction, and supporting Chevron's application, with certain limitations, "unless Congress in­
dicates otherwise"). 
13. See Mark Tushnet, Alternative Forms of Judicial Review 101 MICH. L. REV. 2779, 
2793 (2003) (noting that what he calls "provisional review" may not be "provisional in prac­
tice" if Congress cannot overcome hurdles to legislating different instructions). 
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the opt-out feature of all these methods of judicial review is not a real 
option for Congress, then the emphasis put on the possibility of 
congressional involvement in justifying an approach or in constructing 
a default rule is misplaced at best, and serves as deceptive and 
confusing window dressing at worst. 
To the extent that anyone mentions the possibility of greater 
congressional involvement,1 4  it is quickly dismissed because Congress 
seldom provides explicit instructions allocating this sort of policy­
making authority. In addition, it is seen as unrealistic to expect that 
Congress will improve its performance.15 In the second Part of this 
Article, I describe a mechanism that could provide Congress an oppor­
tunity to provide explicit instructions about law-interpreting authority. 
Low expectations for congressional performance stem in part from 
a failure to think creatively about the kinds of legislative vehicles 
available to Congress and about internal rules that can structure its 
deliberation. Past discussions assume that Congress could signal its 
delegation decision in one of two ways. First, Congress could pass a 
broad statute that would allocate the law-interpreting function either 
to agencies or courts with respect to all statutes unless subsequent laws 
vary the default rule. Arguably, Section 706 of the Administrative 
Procedure Act16 is a broad statement delegating that authority to 
courts, contrary to the rule adopted in Chevron.17 Alternatively, 
Congress could make the decision with respect to each statute, 
perhaps also amending previously enacted statutes that are silent on 
the issue. 
I suggest that Congress has another way to communicate its choice 
among institutions. In statutes that periodically reauthorize adminis­
trative agencies and large federal programs or that annually appropri­
ate funds to agencies, Congress could determine on an agency-by­
agency basis whether to delegate the power to make policy through 
14. Merrill briefly discusses this option, considering both the possibility that Congress 
might pass a broad statute or that it would provide instructions statute-by-statute. See 
Merrill, The Mead Doctrine, supra note 11 ,  at 824-25. 
15. See, e.g., Barron & Kagan, supra note 4, at 203, 227. 
16. 5 u.s.c. § 706 (2000). 
17. See, e.g., Jonathan T. Molot, Reexamining Marbury in the Administrative State: A 
Structural and Institutional Defense of Judicial Power Over Statutory Interpretation, 96 NW. 
U. L. REV. 1239, 1249 (2002) (reading § 706 as an express congressional affirmation of "judi­
cial power over law declaration"). But see Merrill & Hickman, supra note 4, at 871 ("Chev­
ron deference is consistent with the APA's direction to courts to decide all relevant ques-
' 
tions of law because virtually all the statutes that reflect an implicit delegation of 
interpretational authority either postdate the APA or have been reenacted since its pas­
sage . . . .  In effect, every time Congress has made an implied delegation to an administrative 
agency, it has silently amended section 706 of the APA."). Michael Herz disputes such a 
reading of § 706 and Chevron, noting that the APA states that no subsequent statute can 
supersede or modify the APA unless it does so expressly. See Michael Herz, Textualism and 
Taboo: Interpretation and Deference for Justice Scalia, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1663, 1667 
(1991 ) (citing § 559 of the APA). 
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statutory interpretation with respect to all statutes that the agency 
administers, or with respect to some subset of decisions. Congress 
could define that subset using a procedural metric, as the Court 
appears to do in Mead, or on some other basis. The congressional 
decision could be based on the variety of factors, including those iden­
tified by courts and others as relevant to whether a delegation of law­
interpreting authority to agencies makes sense. In particular, Congress 
could assess the performance of each agency and judge whether it is 
the best entity to make the policy decisions inherent in interpreting 
vague or ambiguous statutory language. Congress would also have the 
ability to revise its determination over time as it reassessed agency 
performance. 
This proposal is designed to take seriously the feature of judicial 
review of regulatory statutes that contemplates the possibility of an ac­
tive role for Congress. There are two decisions in the context of regu­
latory policy that require choices between institutions. First, either 
Congress or the judiciary has to decide which governance institution 
has the primary responsibility for shaping regulatory policy through 
statutory interpretation. This decision implicates the design and 
authority of administrative agencies; it is a decision that determines 
the contours of the policymaking process over time. In part because of 
the tension between modern regulatory precedents and Marbury18 and 
in part because the decision to vest an institution with law-interpreting 
authority is such a vital aspect of policymaking, the various proposals 
for judicial review provide Congress the first opportunity to make the 
choice of interpreters. But if Congress does not fill this role for some 
reason, the courts must decide whether to interpret the statute them­
selves or defer to reasonable agency views. Which institution is the 
primary interpreter is thus the second institutional-choice decision, 
and it can be made on various grounds, all of which Congress is better 
suited to consider but which are not impossible for courts to assess and 
apply. 
In this complex interplay among the various government players, 
we could be more confident that Congress actually has the capacity to 
intervene occasionally, or even frequently, if a procedural framework 
made the issue more salient to lawmakers when they decided other 
similar issues of regulatory design. To put it more bluntly, if we want 
to pay more than lip service to the notion that Congress might be a 
vital player in decisions to allocate interpretive authority to other 
institutions, we should think seriously about procedures that could 
empower legislators in this realm. If we decide that actual congres­
sional involvement will never or only rarely occur, even with new 
18. See Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 
DUKE L.J. 511 ,  513-14 (discussing the tension between modern administrative law ap­
proaches and Marbury). 
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action-prompting procedures, then our attention would be better 
focused on developing judicial strategies to allocate interpretive 
authority without reference to congressional intentions. 
I. DISCOVERING - OR CONSTRUCTING - CONGRESSIONAL 
INTENT TO DELEGATE 
The traditional challenge presented by the interaction of Chevron 
and Marbury is to determine in a particular case whether Congress 
actually has delegated law-interpreting power to an agency. There are 
occasional explicit delegations, just as there are sometimes specific 
statutory provisions revealing that Congress has determined that 
courts should interpret statutory terms without any enhanced atten­
tion to the agency's views.19 Such explicit instructions may have once 
occurred more frequently than they do now. Thomas Merrill and 
Kathryn Tongue Watts argue that in the first half of the twentieth 
century, Congress followed a drafting convention to signal its inten­
tion to authorize agencies to act with the force of law. Merrill and 
Watts maintain this power included the ability to interpret ambiguous 
language and fill statutory gaps. Pursuant to this convention, as these 
authors understand it, when Congress delegated to an agency the 
authority to engage in rulemaking along with a specific provision 
authorizing it to impose sanctions for violations of such rules, 
Congress intended agencies to act with "force of law" and for courts to 
defer to reasonable agency decisions.20 The courts failed to pick up on 
this coded signal,21 but the congressional convention may demonstrate 
that the legislature has sometimes considered the delegation issue and 
reached a conclusion, albeit one cryptically conveyed. 
Express congressional instructions are rare, so in most cases a 
court must work to determine if there has been an implicit delegation. 
19. For cases dealing with relatively explicit delegations to agencies, see Batterton v. 
Francis, 432 U.S. 4 16, 425 (1977) ("Congress in § 407(a) expressly delegated to the Secretary 
the power to prescribe standards for determining what constitutes 'unemployment' for pur­
poses of AFDC-UF eligibility. In a situation of this kind, Congress entrusts to the Secretary, 
rather than to the courts, the primary responsibility for interpreting the statutory term."), 
and Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Products, Inc. , 322 U.S. 607, 613-14 (1944) (finding such a 
delegation in statute that qualified a term with the parenthetical "(as defined by the Admin­
istrator)"). Merrill and Hickman argue that an explicit delegation to an agency of rulemak­
ing authority should be understood as an intentional delegation to the agency of primary 
interpretive authority as well. See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 4, at 874-77. Cases consis­
tent with that view include Herweg v. Ray, 455 U.S. 265, 274-75 (1982); Rowan Cos. v. United 
States, 452 U.S. 247, 253 (1981); and Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 44 (1981). Bar­
ron and Kagan provide an example of Congress explicitly instructing courts to determine 
interpretive issues "without unequal deference" to the agency view. See Barron & Kagan, 
supra note 4, at 216 n.58 (citing Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6714(e) (2000)). 
20. See Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency Rules with the Force of 
Law: The Original Convention, 116 HARV. L. REV. 467, 503-26 (2002). 
21. Id. at 475. 
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The cases reveal various approaches to this question, some that are 
more rule-like in nature, and others that rely on more open-textured 
standards. Courts have moved between the two approaches, currently 
resting somewhere in the middle. Moreover, even when courts have 
adopted a relatively bright-line rule apparently requiring deference to 
agencies in many circumstances, in practice judges have often resisted 
deferring to agency interpretations, deciding instead that the statutory 
language clearly compels only one result. In the absence of explicit 
congressional communication, any quest for congressional intent may 
obscure what is actually occurring: the judiciary is determining 
whether to defer to an agency interpretation without any guidance, 
implicit or otherwise, from Congress. 
Although courts deferred to some agency interpretations of stat­
utes before Chevron,22 the basis for deference was not entirely clear 
and often seemed to rest on the agency's power to persuade the court 
that its interpretation, a product of its expertise, was the best under­
standing of vague or ambiguous language. Chevron can be understood 
as adopting a rule-like presumption that statutory silence or ambiguity 
should be read as an implicit delegation to agencies. The rule-like 
quality of Chevron was in part a reaction to the complex, multifactor 
approach to judicial deference used in the pre-Chevron era.23 By pro­
viding a clear default rule that all cases of statutory ambiguity would 
be understood as a delegation to the agency to determine the meaning 
of the text, Chevron attempted to provide certainty and predictability 
for Congress, agencies, and the regulated. The most enthusiastic 
proponent of Chevron as an across-the-board presumption, Justice 
Scalia, does not argue that it would capture actual congressional intent 
in many, or even most cases.24 Indeed, as a textualist, Scalia is not par­
ticularly concerned with congressional intent in any context; he has 
expressed strong doubts that it is a coherent concept.25 Instead, he 
maintains that "any rule adopted in this field represents merely a 
fictional, presumed intent, and operates principally as a background 
rule of law against which Congress can legislate."26 
22. See, e.g. , NLRB v. Hearst Publ'ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 1 1 1  (1944); see also id. at 130 (sug­
gesting that at least part of the reason for deference to the Board should be whether Con­
gress "entrusted" the relevant decision to the agency). 
23. See Colin S. Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State, 133 U. PA. L. 
REV. 549, 562-67 (1985) (discussing factors used) . 
24. See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 18, at 517; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes 
in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 445 (1989) [hereinafter Sunstein, Interpret­
ing Statutes in the Regulatory State] ("An ambiguity is simply not a delegation of law­
interpreting power. Chevron confuses the two."). 
25. See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATIER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS 
AND THE LAW 16-18 (1997). 
26. Scalia, supra note 18, at 517; see also United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 241 
(2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the principle of Chevron is "rooted in a legal pre-
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The connection between Chevron's presumption and actual 
congressional wishes is further undermined because the presumption 
has been applied to all regulatory statutes, not just those passed after 
the Court changed its approach from a multifactor analysis to a strong 
presumption. For statutes enacted before 1984, including the Clean 
Air Act provision at issue in Chevron, Congress could not be 
presumed to have relied on the default rule and therefore used ambi­
guity to signal its delegation of law-interpreting authority to agencies. 
Notwithstanding the lack of connection between the presumption 
and an actual congressional intent to delegate in many contexts, pro­
ponents argue that the rule allows for certainty in the future. If the 
rule is applied consistently, Congress can draft statutes in reliance on 
the default regime.27 Thus, if Congress is silent about which institution 
has the primary responsibility for interpreting unclear statutory text, 
the legislature can be fairly understood as intending that agencies 
fulfill that role. In addition, an across-the-board presumption offers 
the promise of reducing judicial decision costs. In theory, a bright-line 
rule that ambiguity or silence results in deference, absent congres­
sional instructions to the contrary, is easy for judges to apply, particu­
larly compared to a multifactor standard. Finally, use of the rule has· 
been justified because any errors (measured against the baseline of 
what Congress intended) occur in favor of policymaking by a more 
democratically accountable institution, the executive branch, rather 
than by the insulated, unelected, and life-tenured judicial branch.28 
Chevron's rule-like quality has caused substantial unease for some 
judges and scholars, however, largely because of the doctrinal impor­
tance of congressional delegation.29 For many, the key question 
remains whether Chevron leads to deference only, or even mainly, 
in cases where Congress actually delegated interpretive power to 
the agencies, or whether the rule is overinclusive, requiring judicial 
deference even in cases where Congress had no intent or would have 
preferred a more aggressive judicial stance.30 Moreover, in practice, 
Chevron has not provided a certain background regime against which 
Congress can act, a factor which may undermine Congress's ability to 
sumption of congressional intent, important to the division of powers" between the branches 
of government). 
27. See Scalia, supra note 18, at 517 (suggesting that for statutes enacted after the adop­
tion of the Chevron presumption, congressional silence might fairly be read as a delegation 
to an agency to provide meaning for vague or ambiguous terms). 
28. See, e.g., Manning, supra note 5, at 627 ("Chevron adopts a background presumption 
that reconciles now firmly established conceptions of delegation with constitutional struc­
ture. It is more consistent with the assumptions of our constitutional system to vest discre­
tion in more expert, representative, and accountable administrative agencies."). 
29. A rule like Chevron's may be persuasively defended on grounds other than congres­
sional delegation, a possibility I will discuss further infra text accompanying notes 76-79. 
30. See, e.g., Farina, supra note 4, at 470-71. 
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implement any desire to provide express directives. The scope of 
Chevron is unclear,31 and judges can avoid deferring to the agency 
interpretation if they find that statutory meaning is unambiguous. By 
aggressively employing methods of statutory construction, courts 
decide cases at Step One of Chevron, thereby saying what the law is in 
the traditional sense, and avoiding deference to reasonable agency 
understandings that the judges do not share.32 Scalia has acknowl­
edged that one reason. he supports Chevron as an across-the-board 
presumption is that his method of interpretation allows him to resolve 
many cases at Step One, avoiding the distasteful prospect of accepting 
an agency view with which he disagrees.33 In addition, at Step Two a 
judge can avoid deferring to an arguably reasonable interpretation by 
finding conflicts between the agency's policy decision and the judge's 
reading of the relevant statute's purposes or goals.34 
Several commentators have observed after conducting various 
studies of the case law that the effect of Chevron on judicial outcomes 
has not been as significant as one might have expected, although many 
have found some increased level of judicial deference to agency inter­
pretations.35 In addition, it was not entirely clear until recently 
31. Steven Croley, The Scope of Chevron (July 2001) (unpublished manuscript, pre­
pared fo: the Scope of Judicial Review portion of the Project on the Administrative Proce­
dure Act, ABA's Administrative Law and Regulatory Practice Section), available at 
http://www.abanet.org/adminlaw/apa/chevronscopejuly.doc. Merrill recently observed that 
the Chevron rule has elements of a more open-textured standard, undermining the predict­
ability that it promises, although it is more rule-like than the judicial approach before 1984 
and than the approach in Mead. See Merrill, The Mead Doctrine, supra note 1 1 ,  at 808-09, 
818. 
32. See Elizabeth Garrett, Step One of Chevron v. National Resources Defense Council 
(Apr. 2001) (unpublished manuscript, prepared for the Scope of Judicial Review portion of 
the Project on the Administrative Procedure Act, ABA's Administrative Law and Regula­
tory Practice Section, on file with author) (assessing judicial practice applying Step One of 
Chevron), available at www.abanet.org/adminlaw/apa/chevronrev4200 I .doc. 
33. See Scalia, supra note 18, at 521 . 
34. M. Elizabeth Magill, Step Two of Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council 
(July 2001) (unpublished manuscript, prepared for the Scope of Judicial Review portion of 
the Project on the Administrative Procedure Act, ABA's Administrative Law and Regula­
tory Practice Section), available at http://www.abanet.org/adminlaw/apa/abachevronl .doc. 
Ronald Levin has argued convincingly that many of these cases are really Step One cases 
although the statutory interpretation by the court is done when assessing the reasonableness 
of the agency's interpretation. He terms such cases "belatedly discovered clear meaning" 
cases. See Ronald M. Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two Reconsidered, 72 CHI.­
KENT L. REV. 1253, 1283-84 (1997). 
35. Aaron P. Avila, Application of the Chevron Doctrine in the D.C. Circuit, 8 N.Y.U. 
ENVTL. L.J. 398 (2000); Linda R. Cohen & Matthew L. Spitzer, Solving the Chevron Puzzle, 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1994, at 65; Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the 
Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of Federal Ad!J1inistrative Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 984 (all 
three articles finding some effect on deference attributable to Chevron); cf Thomas W. 
Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969, 970 (1992) [hereinaf­
ter Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent] (finding no "discernible relationship" 
between Chevron and greater deference and also considering the role of textualism during 
this period). All these findings are somewhat unsatisfying, and more suggestive than conclu-
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whether other justices shared Scalia's view that Chevron operates as 
an across-the-board presumption. In Mead, the majority rejects such 
an understanding, claiming it is an inaccurate portrayal of judicial 
practice.36 If Congress and interest groups are uncertain about the 
application of the judicial rule, crafting a legislative response is more 
difficult. 
Given the doctrinally pivotal role of congressional delegations in 
legitimizing deferential judicial review, some have advocated that the 
courts should work to discern in each case whether Congress intended, 
or would have intended, that the agency interpret unclear statutory 
language. Writing a few years after Chevron, then-Judge Breyer 
agreed with Scalia that congressional intent to delegate in these cases 
is a "kind of legal fiction" in that it is often constructed by courts 
without any explicit directive from the legislature.37 Breyer argued that 
courts should work to find implicit congressional intent by analyzing 
what a reasonable legislator would have intended with regard to the 
delegation issue, in light of all the practical circumstances surrounding 
the particular enactment. In other words, to reduce errors in the judi­
cial determination of whether Congress wanted or would have wanted 
to delegate law-interpreting powers to an agency, courts should 
employ a multifactor approach reminiscent of the pre-Chevron 
analysis.38 But this approach is not wholly satisfactory for those 
pursuing an intentionalist course either. The use of such a standard 
imposes high decision costs on the judiciary; and even if judges use 
such an approach in a sophisticated manner, they may still misjudge 
whether Congress intended, or would have intended, to delegate law 
interpretation to the agencies. 
Recently, the Court has tried to resolve the disagreement by 
adopting a sort of middle ground. In Mead, the Court articulates a 
standard of judicial review that has both rule-like and standard-like 
components. The objective of the new approach is the same as the 
objective articulated in Chevron: to discover Congress's intent as to 
which institution - courts or agencies - should make policy by inter-
sive, because of limitations in the data. For example, after the adoption of a new approach 
became clear to litigants, the mix of cases reaching courts shifted as those who lost before 
agencies challenged only the decisions that they believed likely to be overturned. See also 
Schuck & Elliott, supra, at 995-96, 1060-61 (discussing limitations in data and study design 
but concluding that the analysis nonetheless sheds light on important questions). 
36. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 237-38 (2001). 
37. Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review gf Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADM IN. L. REV. 
363, 370 (1986). 
38. Id. at 370-73; see also Farina, supra note 4, at 528 (acknowledging difficulty for 
courts of a multifactor and nuanced approach but arguing that it is constitutionally com­
pelled). 
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preting ambiguous or vague statutory language.39 Mead holds that 
deference is appropriate when "Congress would expect the agency to 
be able to speak with the force of law when it addressed ambiguity in 
the statute or fills a space in the enacted law."40 To reach a conclusion 
that an agency has the power to regulate with the force of law, Mead 
appears to allow judges and agencies to rely on a safe harbor, holding 
that "it is fair to assume generally that Congress contemplates admin­
istrative action with the effect of law when it provides for a relatively 
formal administrative procedure tending to foster the fairness and 
deliberation that should underlie a pronouncement of such force."41 
Thus, when an agency promulgates its statutory interpretation as part 
of notice-and-comment rulemaking, formal adjudication, or formal 
rulemaking, courts should defer to reasonable agency interpretations 
of ambiguous text because they should infer that Congress has dele­
gated that authority to agencies when it accorded them the power to 
act through such procedures. 
If the choice of format entirely determined the level of deference 
and controlled the finding of implicit congressional delegation, Mead's 
formulation would have the virtues of a relatively predictable rule, 
albeit one with a narrower scope than Chevron's broad presumption. 
But the Court went on to say that "the want of that procedure here 
does not decide the case, for we have sometimes found reasons for 
Chevron deference even when no such administrative formality was 
required and none was afforded."42 Thus, circumstances other than the 
formality of procedures authorized by Congress can give rise to defer­
ence because of delegation, but Mead provides little guidance about 
what those circumstances might be.43 In general, courts should assess 
factors that suggest Congress intended the agency to act with force of 
law, an inference easily drawn, the Court says, when Congress allows 
agencies to use certain procedures to regulate, but also possible in 
other unspecified circumstances. 
To the extent that Mead posits a general rule to discern implicit 
congressional intent, the link between the procedure authorized and 
the amount of law-interpreting authority delegated is not immediately 
39. See Merrill & Watts, supra note 20, at 479 (noting that the Mead Court "made clear 
that Chevron deference is grounded in a congressional intent to delegate primary interpre­
tive authority to the agency"). 
40. Mead, 533 U.S. at 229. 
41. Id. at 230. Merrill and Watts argue that the agency's use of such procedures is itself 
not sufficient to allow a conclusion that Congress intended the agency to have the power to 
act with force of law. The determination of Congress's intent should be a separate inquiry 
from the question whether the agency then used the procedures necessary to promulgate a 
regulation with legislative force. See Merrill & Watts, supra note 20, at 477-81. 
42. Mead, 533 U.S. at 231. 
43. For an indictment of Mead's hybrid approach, see Adrian Vermeule, Mead in the 
Trenches, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 347 (2003). 
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clear. As Ronald Levin has observed, "If the notion that Congress 
regularly contemplates Chevron deference in passing regulatory legis­
lation is a fiction, as it seems widely agreed, surely the notion that 
Congress regularly makes decisions about whether a given procedural 
format should trigger Chevron deference is even more of a fiction."44 
David Barron and Elena Kagan similarly argue that in some cases 
Congress may want courts to exercise independent and relatively 
aggressive judicial review of agency interpretation of statutes even 
when the interpretation is provided through formal procedures or 
notice-and-comment rulemaking. Conversely, in some cases Congress 
may want "to give interpretive authority to an agency separate and 
apart from the power to issue rules or orders with independent legal 
effect on parties."45 The point is that Mead's safe harbor is not neces­
sarily an accurate proxy for congressional delegation to agencies, 
although perhaps it is a tighter fit than the broader Chevron rule 
because it affects a smaller subset of agency decisions and considers 
one factor that is surely relevant to discovering actual intent. But by 
raising the procedural issue to a safe harbor, Mead sacrifices the objec­
tive of getting the delegation question right in favor of certainty and 
predictability - a goal that it then undermines by suggesting vaguely 
that other circumstances might also dictate substantial judicial defer­
ence.46 Supreme Court opinions since Mead can be read to suggest that 
the Court is returning to a multifactor approach, assessing a variety of 
considerations relevant to either discovering an implicit congressional 
delegation or determining what a reasonable legislature would have 
done in a particular case.47 
The challenges posed for courts by a multifactor standard are 
substantial because so many factors might be relevant. As Barron and 
Kagan observe: "Congress's view on deference (were Congress to 
consider the matter) likely would hinge on numerous case-specific and 
agency-specific variables, not readily susceptible to judicial under­
standing or analysis."48 Various relevant factors can be discerned from 
the case law and other discussions of the formulation of regulatory 
44. Ronald M. Levin, Mead and the Prospective Exercise of Discretion, 54 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 771, 792 (2002). 
45. Barron & Kagan, supra note 4, at 219. 
46. Some judicial deference may be appropriate even to interpretations by agencies that 
are not promulgated through formal procedures and that do not exhibit any other features 
that would allow courts to infer that Congress delegated the law-interpreting function to the 
agency. But in these cases, deference is due because the agency interpretation is persuasive 
and reflects superior expertise, a less stringent level of deference provided in Skidmore v. 
Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
47. See William S. Jordan III, Updating Deference: The Court's 2001-2002 Term Sows 
More Confusion About Chevron, 32 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 11459, 11463-67 (2002) 
(discussing cases). 
48. Barron & Kagan, supra note 4, at 223. 
August 2003] Legislating Chevron 2649 
policy. Any judicial attempt to discern congressional intent or to 
conclude what the legislature might intend if members thought about 
the issue could require consideration of at least four types of issues, 
some of which have not played a role in judicial deliberations in the 
past. 
First, the kind of question arguably delegated to the agency is rele­
vant in the inquiry. Whether Congress has delegated broadly or 
narrowly, whether the issue lies in the particular expertise of the 
agency and of experts generally,49 whether it depends primarily on 
qualitative or quantitative assessments,50 and whether it relates to 
other areas in which the agency has broad authority would be appro­
priate considerations. Chevron mentions some of these factors as justi­
fication for finding delegation in ambiguity.51 
Second, as Mead indicates, the kind of procedure authorized by 
Congress and used by the agency seems pertinent, but more than just 
the formality of the process ought to be considered in the application 
of a multifactor standard. For example, the transparency of the proc­
ess,52 the degree of participation by affected interests, and the legal 
effect of the action that will emerge from the process (i.e., whether the 
ruling is broadly applicable and perhaps whether it is self-executing53) 
all seem relevant considerations. 
Third, Barron and Kagan have argued that deference ought to rest 
in some degree on who in the agency has made the actual interpretive 
decision, so that only decisions made by "the official Congress named 
in the relevant delegation" would qualify for Chevron deference.54 
One might disagree with the emphasis that Barron and Kagan place 
on this factor,55 but it certainly is a candidate for consideration, at least 
in some circumstances. 
Fourth, although seemingly overlooked in the case law, character­
istics of the particular agency are no doubt relevant to Congress when 
it decides whether to delegate law-interpreting powers. Notwith­
standing the importance of this factor, none of the judicial approaches, 
49. See, e.g. , Molot, supra note 17, at 1255-56. 
50. See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz, Toward a Jurisprudence of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 100 
MICH. L. REV. 1708, 1731 (2002) (reviewing CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT STATE: 
THE FUTURE OF REGULATORY PROTECTION (2002); arguing for more deference to quanti­
tative analysis by agencies). One could make arguments for precisely the opposite conclu­
sion, however, if qualitative judgments depend more crucially on policy determinations. 
51.  See, e.g., Chevron v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 862-66 ( 1984). 
52. See, e.g. , Michael J. Hayes, After "Hiding the Ball" is Over: How the NLRB Must 
Change Its Approach to Decision-Making, 33 RUTGERS L.J. 523, 565 (2002) (discussing 
NLRB cases where courts have emphasized this factor). 
53. See, e.g. , Merrill & Hickman, supra note 4, at 891 (discussing this factor in a different 
context). 
54. Barron & Kagan, supra note 4, at 235. 
55. See, e.g. , Merrill & Watts, supra note 20, at 578-79 n.620. 
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whether they are rule-like or standard-like, make distinctions on the 
basis of which agency is interpreting the statute.56 Instead, Chevron's 
rule has been applied to any ambiguous statutory language, regardless 
of which agency was charged with administering the regulatory 
program. Similarly, Mead's safe harbor of certain formal procedures is 
available for any agency that has been granted the power to use such 
formats for policymaking. The absence of agency-specific considera­
tions in the analysis seems strange, at least to the extent that the tests 
purport to discern actual congressional intent. Congress's decision to 
delegate authority to a particular agency is informed by both its view 
of agency capabilities generally and the reputation and qualifications 
of the particular agency. 
Notwithstanding their apparent relevance, courts tend to refrain 
from explicitly considering agency-specific variables, even when they 
use multifactor standards rather than across-the-board rules. Of 
course, determinations of agency expertise, arguably relevant to 
Chevron deference, perhaps available under Mead, and certainly 
relevant to Skidmore deference, can involve varying degrees of 
agency-specific evaluations.57 One suspects that courts also treat agen­
cies differently on the basis of their reputations, although this factor is 
not expressly identified as influential. 58 For example, some have noted 
that the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB") seems to be 
given less deference, in part because of its preference to make 
policy through adjudication and not rulemaking59 but also because its 
56. A task force appointed by the American Bar Association's Section on Taxation to 
study the effect of Mead on tax law is currently drafting a report that views Mead as an invi­
tation to determine deference on an agency-by-agency basis. It will also argue that special 
considerations apply in the tax law context justifying deference to a variety of pronounce­
ments not limited to those produced by notice-and-comment rulemaking. See E-mail from 
Ellen Aprill, co-author of Task Force Report, to author (June 10, 2003) (on file with author). 
57. See Rossi, supra note 2, at 1135-36 (discussing in context of deference to rulings by 
the EEOC). 
58. See Abramowicz, supra note 50, at 1739 ("Perhaps courts already consider agency 
reputation implicitly, seeking to curtail agencies with a reputation for stretching their 
authority or achieving ideological objectives."); see also JAFFE, supra note 4, at 557 (making 
general point well before Chevron); Jerry L. Mashaw, Agency Statutory Interpretation, 
ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP (Dynamic Statutory Interpretation series, Article 9, 2002), 
at http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss3/art9 (observing generally that agencies have different 
reputations depending on their behavior); Schuck & Elliott, supra note 35, at 1021-22 (find­
ing different "success" rates for different agencies, but suggesting that those differences 
could be a function of subject matter or procedural choice, rather than of agency reputa­
tion). 
59. It appears that interpretations adopted in formal adjudications do receive Chevron 
deference, a conclusion buttressed by Mead. See Croley, supra note 31, at 3 (describing ap­
plication of Chevron to formal adjudications). Scholars have argued whether such deference 
in the context of formal adjudications is appropriate, however, and the judicial treatment has 
not been consistent. See Hayes, supra note 52, at 564-71 (discussing scholarly debate and 
judicial opinions, but concluding that deference to NLRB adjudications is appropriate under 
Chevron and Mead). 
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reputation makes it suspect in some quarters.60 Other agencies with 
problematic reputations, like the Federal Election Commission 
and the Immigration and Naturalization Service, may also receive less 
deference in practice, although this reality is seldom explicitly stated in 
opinions. 61 
If one wants to determine whether Congress really has delegated 
law-interpreting power to an agency, assessing the characteristics and 
general reputation of the agency is crucial. Relevant factors include 
whether the agency is independent or under the direct control of the 
President;62 whether the agency is subject to capture by powerful 
interest groups and what sort of interest-group activity typifies its 
regulatory environment; how politically salient the issues within the 
agency's jurisdiction are for the general public; the political pressures 
brought to bear on the agency by Congress, its committees, and 
the President; and indications that the President, the Office of 
Management and Budget, or other executive-branch officers do not 
trust the agency. How these factors play out in each case is not obvi­
ous. For example, does evidence that the President is not pleased with 
the agency's regulatory decisions indicate that the agency relies on 
expertise, rather than politics, to set policy? And how should an 
agency weigh political considerations with other factors in interpreting 
its organic statute? 
This list of factors is by no means exhaustive, although its breadth 
and complexity provide a sense of the challenge to courts in applying 
multifactor standards. The complexity is increased because the mix 
of factors will change over time as Congress's view of appropriate 
delegations changes, or as the relationship among the branches 
evolves. Moreover, the factors will sometimes point to different 
conclusions about the congressional delegation even within the same 
statute, adding to the complications.63 In short, both types of judicial 
60. Not only might judges, particularly conservative ones, view the NLRB with distrust, 
but the statutory framework in which the Board operates might suggest that Congress views 
the agency as less deserving of deference. See Merrill, The Mead Doctrine, supra note 1 1 ,  at 
832. Merrill and Hickman argue that less deference is appropriately paid to NLRB interpre­
tations made through adjudication because the Board's orders are not self-executing. Merrill 
& Hickman, supra note 4, at 892. But see Barron & Kagan, supra note 4, at 219 (arguing that 
the fact courts must execute NLRB adjudicatory orders ought not to make a difference in 
the level of deference). 
61. The observation in the text is based in part on my experience as a clerk in the D.C. 
Circuit Court of Appeals and on the views of other clerks, including Richard Primus, the 
moderator of this panel. Both agencies have received Chevron deference in the past. See 
William S. Jordan, III, Judicial Review of Informal Statutory Interpretations: The A nswer is 
Chevron Step Two, not Christensen or Mead, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 719, 731 (2002). 
62. See Elhauge, supra note 12, at 2150 (noting that Chevron has not been applied in a 
way that differentiates between independent and executive agencies, contrary to what one 
might have expected if the doctrine were based on the presence of presidential accountabil­
ity for agency action). 
63. See Farina, supra note 4, at 472 (discussing Breyer's approach). 
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approaches - the across-the-board presumption which provides 
certainty (at least in theory) at the price of errors in determining 
congressional intent and the more nuanced standard which imposes 
decision costs on the judiciary with uncertain improvements in the 
error rate - have limitations. The fact that both types of judicial 
review are not entirely satisfactory may explain why courts have been 
unable to settle on one or the other and, for the time being, are incon­
sistently applying an uneasy combination of the two. 
Although both Marbury and modern administrative law prece- . 
dents indicate that Congress decides whether agencies or courts will 
be the primary interpreters of regulatory statutes, and that courts 
merely ascertain congressional intent as they determine "what the law 
is," the reality is that the judiciary, not Congress, is in the driver's seat. 
Express congressional directives are virtually nonexistent, and courts · 
are often unable to accurately find an implicit delegation or guess · 
what the legislature might have done had it thought about the matter. 
Thus, the first institutional-choice decision - which institution decides 
who will be the primary interpreter of unclear statutes - has been 
effectively resolved in favor of courts. One suspects that, among other 
considerations, the judges' views of the wisdom of the agency's inter­
pretation affect the strength of their deference.64 It is not surprising 
that courts often determine that deference is unwarranted; then judges 
do not face the unattractive prospect of upholding agency interpreta­
tions with which they do not agree. In other words, courts are inter­
ested parties with respect to the second institutional-choice determina­
tion, and unsurprisingly, they make the choice in favor of judicial 
primacy in many cases. But because judges understand that the 
doctrine demands they obey any congressional instruction, the juris­
prudence has been unstable as courts vacillate among various unsatis­
factory methods purporting to enable them to find congressional 
intent. Courts seem unwilling to eschew the inquiry into intent alto­
gether and to explicitly embark on the formulation of a judicial doc­
trine, perhaps one based solely on institutional considerations, that 
could provide more certainty for regulated parties, agencies, and 
Congress. 
But is this the only possible state of affairs? How would the second 
institutional-choice decision - whether agencies or courts have the 
primary responsibility to interpret statutes - be resolved if Congress 
64. See, e.g., Linda R. Cohen & Matthew L. Spitzer, Judicial Deference to Agency 
Action: A Rational Choice Theory and an Empirical Test, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 431, 474-75 
(1996) (finding that "the Court does not uniformly endorse judicial deference, but rather 
does so discriminately in the years where the doctrine yields policy outcomes more to the 
Court's liking"); Cohen & Spitzer, supra note 35, at 108-09 (predicting correctly that the 
relatively politically conservative Supreme Court justices would adopt doctrines requiring 
less deference to agency interpretations as the Democrats had more influence on agency 
outcomes). 
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more frequently provided clear instructions? Whether such explicit 
congressional directives are likely or even possible is the question I 
turn to next. 
II. PROVIDING CONGRESS THE OPPORTUNITY TO LEGISLATE 
CHEVRON 
The decision to delegate law-interpreting authority to an agency or 
a court is different from the sort of delegation decision Congress 
usually makes in the regulatory context. Typically, Congress enacts 
substantive policy, and the extent of detail it provides in the delega­
tion will determine how much discretion the subsequent policymaker 
has as it pursues regulatory objectives. Here, however, the delegation 
concerns which institution is given the discretion to set policy - courts 
or agencies. Congress can provide more or less detail to constrain the 
discretion, and the level of detail may be affected by the congressional 
view of the institution that will exercise the discretion.65 At first glance, 
it may seem unlikely that in many cases Congress could reach agree­
ment about the choice of interpretive institution wh.en it could not also 
enact a sufficiently specific law so that substantial interpretation would 
be largely unnecessary. But the two decisions are not identical. For 
example, Congress may decide to delegate interpretive authority when 
it establishes the agency and designs its structure. At that point, 
Congress and interested parties will not be sure of all the precise is­
sues that the agency will confront as it pursues its regulatory agenda, 
so achieving substantive specificity may be difficult. Or lawmakers 
may not agree on the resolution of specific substantive issues, leaving 
statutory terms vague or ambiguous, but a majority may prefer that 
the agency serve as the primary institution for filling statutory gaps. 
Thus, while the frequency with which Congress might be able to 
explicitly delegate the interpretive role when it cannot also precisely 
legislate on the substantive issues is not certain, it is likely that such 
occasions will arise. 
As I discussed above, many factors are relevant to determine insti­
tutional competence to make policy within the authority delegated 
through vague, ambiguous, or incomplete language. These factors 
relate to the nature of the issue, the procedures through which agency 
interpretations will be reached, the position of the agency official 
likely to adopt the interpretation, the reputation and expertise of the 
agency itself, the need for a relatively independent determination 
rather than a decision infused with politics and specific regulatory 
missions, and the need to integrate an interpretive decision into a 
65. See, e.g., DA YID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: How 
CONGRESS ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION (1993) (focusing on typical dele­
gation issues relating to specificity and discretion). 
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complex regulatory framework. Congress is better suited than the 
courts to weighing these factors in the larger context of designing the 
regulatory state and the entities that will administer it. 
A. Congress and Opt-Out Provisions of Default Rules Used in 
Judicial Review of Regulatory Statutes 
Congress, because of its frequent interactions with agency person­
nel, has a better sense than the judicial branch of the expertise that 
can be brought to bear by a particular agency on a question of statu­
tory interpretation. Lawmakers either already know or can easily 
gather information - using committees, staff, and witnesses - about 
the larger statutory framework in which an agency works, the general 
level of discretion accorded to the agency, and the reputation that the 
agency has developed over time and enjoys currently. Little of that 
information will be available to a court trying to determine, within the 
confines of a particular case dealing with specific facts and parties, 
whether it should defer to an agency interpretation of a few words of 
statutory text. In addition, Congress can revise its decision to delegate 
authority to an agency or the judiciary to account for changes in the 
regulatory environment, changes that are often related to expertise 
but might also turn on shifts in the political environment. A court finds 
revision more difficult, because it must wait for an appropriate case, 
because of the institutional constraint of precedent, and because it 
often lacks the information necessary to justify altering course. Thus, 
Congress has technocratic advantages over courts for a variety of 
reasons: its institutional design, access to experts, repeat interactions 
with the agency, and a more comprehensive perspective. 
Political considerations also play a vital role in any decision to 
allocate law-interpreting authority to an agency or to the judiciary 
because interpretation in these contexts is an aspect of regulatory 
policymaking. Determining the appropriate regulatory program, 
including identifying regulatory objectives, prioritizing among various 
objectives in a world of limited resources, and choosing the means to 
reach the objectives considered most worthy of attention, necessarily 
and appropriately involves both expertise and politics. Agencies are 
sensitive to the demands of two political principals that they serve -
the President and Congress - and constantly balance those demands 
within the structure of the regulatory framework put into place by an 
earlier group of lawmakers and shaped by the history of actions of 
other Presidents and executive-branch officers.66 Chevron's preference 
that agencies interpret ambiguous statutory language or fill in statu­
tory lacunae was based in part on the Court's understanding of the 
66. See Mashaw, supra note 58, at 14 (discussing various political influences at work to 
shape agency policymaking). 
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relevance of policy and politics to such determinations and its own 
institutional limitations in this respect.67 Yet, it might be the case that, 
in some circumstances, the enacting Congress will prefer that policy­
making through interpretation be more insulated from current politi­
cal pressures than is possible in the agency environment, even in an 
independent agency that is somewhat separate from the President. 
Whatever the allocative choice, it is based in part on political consid­
erations - that is, deciding how extensive a continuing role politics 
should play in regulatory policymaking is itself a political decision, 
taking account of the need to consider current political realities during 
implementation of a regulatory structure devised in the past. 
Once it is acknowledged that political considerations are legitimate 
factors, along with expertise-related considerations, in the interpreta­
tion of regulatory statutes, the desirability of Congress's playing a 
more active role in allocating law-interpreting authority either to 
agencies or courts becomes apparent. Congress has the comparative 
advantage over the judiciary in making the determination concerning 
the appropriate role of politics and making it publicly. Courts 
are loath to discuss political factors transparently in their opinions. In 
a related context of judicial review of the reasonableness of the 
National Highway Transportation Safety Administration's decision to 
rescind certain passive-restraint regulations during the Reagan 
Administration, only Justice Rehnquist explicitly addressed the clear 
political overtones of the agency's decisions: 
The agency's changed view of the [passive-restraint] standard seems to 
be related to the election of a new President of a different political 
party . . . .  A change in administration brought about by the people cast­
ing their votes is a perfectly reasonable basis for an executive agency's 
reappraisal of the costs and benefits of its programs and regulations. As 
long as the agency remains within the bounds established by Congress, it 
is entitled to assess administrative records and evaluate priorities in light 
of the philosophy of the administration.68 
The unwillingness of the State Farm majority to discuss the presence 
and importance of political considerations reflects a general judicial 
distaste for such analysis. Courts either try to avoid the political analy­
sis - which denies them access to an important consideration in the 
decision whether to allocate law-interpreting authority to agencies or 
retain it themselves - or they obscure the role that such an analysis 
67. See Chevron v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865-66 (1984). 
68. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 59 (1983) 
(Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The regulatory decision at issue in 
Chevron was also the result, in significant part, of a change in presidential administration 
and political mood. For a discussion of how a departing administration tries to entrench its 
political values and protect them from changes under a new President from a different party, 
see Nina A. Mendelson, Agency Burrowing: Entrenching Policies and Personnel Before a 
President A rrives, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 557 (2003). 
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plays in their decision, thereby undermining the ability of the public to 
understand and evaluate regulatory policy. The first strategy leads to 
incomplete decisionmaking, and the second is incompatible with 
norms of democratic accountability. Thus, Congress's comparative 
advantage is not merely technocratic, it is also democratic. The more 
democratic institution is the more competent institution to make 
political decisions that should reflect policy judgments of representa­
tives who must answer to the people. 
If Congress has a greater capacity to compare the judicial and 
executive branches and determine which should be given law­
interpreting power in the context of the larger regulatory scheme, why 
not require better evidence that Congress has actually made the dele­
gation decision? One answer is no better evidence is required. 
Congress would generally want courts to defer to agency interpreta­
tions of ambiguous statutory text, so a default rule allocating the 
power to agencies captures what is usually the right answer. Such a 
default rule would be intent mimicking in the way that some contract 
default rules work to decrease transaction costs by specifying what 
parties would typically want.69 If the default rule operated successfully, 
Congress would have to enact express directives only in the small 
number of cases where it prefers that courts serve as the primary 
interpreters of vague and ambiguous language. The default rule would 
thus allow Congress to deploy its limited resources more effectively. 
Recently, Einer Elhauge has advanced an innovative argument to 
support the contention that Chevron as a default rule best captures 
congressional intent.70 He describes Chevron as a way for courts to 
reach outcomes most likely to accord with the enacting legislature's 
wishes because use of the doctrine favors interpretations consistent 
with current enactable political preferences: 
In choosing between default rules [of statutory interpretation], the 
enacting government would realize that a rule that stuck only to enacting 
preferences would maximize its preference satisfaction in the future over 
the statutes it enacted. But a rule that tracked current enactable prefer­
ences would maximize the enacting government's preference satisfaction 
during its time in office over all existing statutes, including those enacted 
by previous legislatures.71 
There is also some empirical evidence, albeit very anecdotal, that 
legislative staff are aware of Chevron, and thus congressional silence 
may be accurately understood as a desire for courts to defer to 
reasonable agency interpretations. Victoria Nourse and Jane Schacter 
69. See Elizabeth Garrett, Legal Scholarship in the Age of Legislation, 34 TULSA L.J. 
679, 68 1 -82 (1999). 
70. Elhauge, supra note 12. 
71. Id. at 2085. 
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provide a case study of the Senate Judiciary Committee suggesting 
that at least some aides are relatively well informed about some 
canons of construction, including the Chevron doctrine.72 Nourse and 
Schacter's work may not be generalizable, particularly because the 
Judiciary Committees are more aware of court decisions and judicial 
methods of interpretation than other committees.73 Moreover, it is not 
clear from their study how much the knowledge of a particular canon 
actually affects legislative drafting.74 
One problem with justifying Chevron on the ground that it best 
mirrors congressional intent is that it is not clear that an intent­
mimicking default rule is appropriate here. When important constitu­
tional values are at stake, as Marbury suggests they are in this context, 
the default can be set so that it protects those values and requires 
Congress to state explicitly that it wishes to adopt a policy close to the 
constitutional gray area.75 If the realities of the legislative process 
make it unlikely that Congress actually can enact express directives, 
however, a Marbury-inspired default rule means that courts will defer 
to agencies in only a handful of cases. In that case, a compelling 
normative argument can be mounted for the opposite approach: an 
across-the-board presumption of deference to agencies. In the face 
of persistent congressional silence, courts should choose a rule that 
allocates lawmaking authority to the democratically accountable 
and more expert agencies, rather than to the judiciary. Perhaps that 
allocation comports with congressional intent, but that is not seen as 
the primary justification for the rule, which is a pragmatic approach to 
deal with the reality of congressional inaction. Congress, rather than 
courts, may have the better technocratic and democratic credentials 
when it comes to allocating the power to interpret laws, but Congress 
does not discharge this responsibility. It is thus better to adopt a rule 
that places primary interpretive authority with the agencies, rather 
than the courts, because of the farmer's superior technocratic and 
democratic credentials.76 As this discussion demonstrates, the default 
rule of judicial review for regulatory statutes can be chosen without 
paying much attention to what Congress intended or might have 
intended. Instead, it can be set according to one's vision of the appro­
priate role of agencies and courts in policymaking through statutory 
72. Victoria F. Nourse & Jane S. Schacter, The Politics of Legislative Drafting: A Con­
gressional Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 601 (2002). 
73. See Mark C. Miller, Congressional Committees and the Federal Courts: A Neo­
Jnstitutional Perspective, 45 W. POL. Q. 949, 959-61 (1992). 
74. Nourse & Schacter, supra note 72, at 601 (noting there was a "common sense" of 
drafting that might be influenced by canons (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
75. See Garrett, supra note 69, at 685-86. 
76. See Cass R. Sunstein, Is Tobacco a Drug? Administrative Agencies as Common Law 
Courts, 47 DUKE L.J. 1013, 1056-57 (1998). 
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interpretation, but with an opt-out provision that allows congressional 
variance. 
Some current scholarship is concerned with determining the right 
background rule for courts to adopt. These scholars sometimes treat 
congressional intent as a relevant but not paramount concern, but 
more importantly they appear to have given up on the notion that 
Congress might decide how to allocate law-interpreting authority in 
any but the rarest of cases. To put it another way, these scholars 
accept that the first institutional-choice decision I have identified -
whether Congress or the courts will decide which institution has the 
power to interpret regulatory statutes - has been essentially made in 
favor of courts. Thus, they seek to focus our attention on ways to 
improve the judicial decision about whether or not to defer to agen­
cies. For example, Cass Sunstein argues that such a judgment should 
be based on institutional attributes, and he favors locating 
law-interpreting authority in the agencies because of their "democratic 
pedigree."77 In addition, interpretation of ambiguous terms in regula­
tory statutes is closely related to "an understanding of underlying 
facts," and agencies have the better technocratic credentials to make 
these judgment calls.78 
Merrill and Watts also favor judicial adoption of a bright-line rule, 
although they link their proposal more closely to ascertaining actual 
congressional intent. Their historical analysis of judicial review of 
regulatory statutes concludes with a discussion of various default rules, 
or canons, that courts could apply in a rule-like fashion. They favor a 
particular approach based on their understanding of the drafting 
convention used by Congress in the first half of the last century, but 
their primary conclusion is that the judiciary should adopt some sort of 
general rule, rather than an ad hoc application of a standard, because 
then Congress will "know[] what to say in a statute to delegate" the 
"power to an agency to act with force of law."79 They envision a 
dialogue between Congress and the courts in which the legislature 
communicates relatively clearly with judges through statutory 
language. If that institutional discussion takes place, courts can more 
legitimately reach conclusions about congressional intent to delegate. 
Interestingly, all the current scholarly approaches to the question 
of judicial review include some role for Congress to play. If the judicial 
approach is conceived as intent-mimicking, then it must be grounded 
77. Id. at 1 056. 
78. Id. at 1057; see also Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 10, at 925-28 (arguing in favor 
of institutional approach in variety of contexts including interpretation of regulatory stat­
utes); Vermeule, supra note 43, at 360-61 (giving serious consideration to adopting the Mead 
procedural safe harbor as a rule of judicial review and adopting an institutional approach 
throughout his analysis). 
79. Merrill & Watts, supra note 20, at 579. 
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on some theory about congressional intent and the ability of Congress 
to vary the rule when its intent is different. If the rule is set for some 
other reason, either to empower the judiciary to interpret the law 
in the context of regulatory statutes (as it does with respect to other 
statutes) or to empower agencies to use statutory interpretation as a 
policymaking tool, room is left for Congress to strike the balance 
differently in a particular case. Presumably, the congressional opt-out 
feature of the default rule proposals is designed to be real and not 
illusory, although few commentators hold out much hope that 
Congress will respond frequently, if at all. Such pessimism has an 
empirical basis. Despite the invitation to Congress to interact with the 
courts in setting the appropriate level of judicial review, Congress 
generally remains silent. That silence is mystifying no matter what 
general approach to judicial review one favors because it seems 
unlikely that Congress would never - or almost never - want to vary 
the background interpretive regime. 
Perhaps Congress's silence reflects its confusion about the default 
rule.so Scholarly proposals, like those discussed above, favor consistent 
application of a bright-line rule that would provide Congress with a 
clear interpretive background. This vision of the optimal approach to 
judicial review diverges substantially from the reality of the judiciary's 
zigzagging course through a variety of approaches, each of which is 
applied inconsistently. Even after the Chevron decision, its scope 
remained unclear, and judges increasingly found deference unneces­
sary as they aggressively used interpretive techniques at Step One. 
The application of the recently adopted Mead approach has so far 
been similarly inconsistent.s1 Without a certain interpretive back­
ground, Congress does not know where to focus its attention. It is 
certainly unrealistic to think that it will delegate clearly in every 
statute, so the inability to target intelligently may reduce the chance 
that it targets at all. Even in the unlikely event that courts choose a 
presumption and stick with it, it is not clear that any judicial canon can 
be frequently salient to lawmakers during the legislative process. Staff 
members and experts in the legislature may think about judicial 
doctrines when crafting bills, but these considerations often fade in the 
press of legislative business. 
Congress may therefore have failed to enter into a dialogue with 
the courts either because it has no clear idea of what it is responding 
to, or because it forgets that an invitation to communicate has been 
offered. A legislative rule backed up with enforcement procedures 
80. For example, Nourse and Shacter's case study does not reveal what legislative 
staffers thought the Chevron canon actually meant or how they thought courts applied it. See 
Nourse & Schacter, supra note 72, at 600-01 n.56. 
81. See Merrill & Watts, supra note 20, at 576 n.615 (discussing subsequent Supreme 
Court cases); Vermeule, supra note 43, at 350-55 (discussing application in the D.C. Circuit). 
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could serve as a reminder to Congress because it would be 
more broadly and frequently salient to lawmakers, particularly if the 
internal rule was triggered when legislation relevant to the agency's 
authority was being considered. A legislative rule is not a complete 
solution. No procedure can eliminate lawmakers' desire to sometimes 
avoid making difficult political decisions or to use open-textured 
language to garner majority support for controversial bills.82 Rules can · 
empower a few members who seek clear resolution of such issues to . 
force a vote of the body on the matter, however. 
B. Devising an Action-Prompting Mechanism to Structure 
Congressional Decisionmaking 
Congressional silence may be primarily the product of congres­
sional unwillingness to address the issue. Rather than taking responsi­
bility for choosing the law-interpreting institution with respect to 
regulatory statutes, lawmakers may often seek to avoid the decision by 
punting it to the judiciary. But it seems unlikely that Congress would 
avoid making the institutional-choice decision in virtually every case. 
Surely, there are some instances where enough lawmakers, either 
because of constituent pressures, ideology, or party pressure, would be 
willing to provide clear instructions if they had the power under con­
gressional procedures to bring the matter to the attention of the full 
body. The widespread acceptance of the conclusion that Congress is 
very unlikely to provide clearer directives allocating law-interpreting 
authority to agencies or courts is supported by an unduly cramped 
view of the legislative vehicles available for Congress to use as a 
means of communication, and a general ignorance in legal scholarship 
of various internal enforcement mechanisms that can increase the 
chance of congressional consideration of particular issues. Only two 
kinds of legislative vehicles have been discussed in the literature as 
mechanisms for Congress to use to opt out of a default rule of judicial 
review; both have limitations. 
First, Congress could pass a broad statute allocating the law­
interpreting power to either agencies or courts with respect to all ques­
tions of ambiguous language, or perhaps assigning the power to agen­
cies in certain defined circumstances (such as when they use particular 
procedures) and to courts in all other instances. Section 706 of the 
Administrative Procedure Act appears to be such a general articula­
tion of institutional choice, requiring "the reviewing court [to] decide 
all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory 
82. See, e.g., Nourse & Schachter, supra note 72, at 620 (concluding that "there are 
strong incentives for congressional drafters to reject the disciplinary demands of courts - to 
achieve action rather than precision, to arrive at agreement rather than precise language, to 
signal meanings in legislative history rather than in the text"). 
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provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of 
an agency action."83 The Bumpers Amendment, considered by 
Congress in the 1970s and early 1980s, was this sort of statute designed 
to underscore that the judiciary should determine the meaning of pro­
visions in regulatory statutes in the same way that they interpret text 
in other statutes.84 Had the Bumpers Amendment passed, courts 
arguably would not have been justified in according substantial defer­
ence to agency interpretations, but could have considered them only 
as extrinsic evidence from an expert source. 
This legislative approach has certain advantages. It applies the 
congressional rule to all statutes, even those enacted in the past. It can 
exempt certain statutes from the blanket rule in a savings provision, 
just as it can vary the rule in subsequent enactments through express 
provisions. Such a congressional enactment might also be more salient 
to Congress than a judicially adopted across-the-board presumption, 
and thus spark more consideration of the delegation issue when 
Congress enacts new regulatory statutes. In addition, interest groups 
may be less influential with respect to a general provision than they 
would be in the context of statute-specific provisions.85 Such a broad 
statute forces interest groups to operate behind a somewhat opaque 
veil of ignorance because they cannot be sure of their positions on all 
affected statutes, or they may be in different positions depending on 
the program and agency.86 
Nonetheless, such "superstatutes" in the regulatory arena have 
been problematic for many in Congress who believe that a one-size­
fits-all or one-size-fits-mostly-all approach is heavy-handed. Others 
may be worried that applying such a general rule to all previously 
enacted statutes would be unwise and lead to unanticipated conse­
quences. Because Congress cannot possibly predict all the possible 
applications of the general rule, it may be better to resolve the delega­
tion issue in a more targeted way, or to leave the decision to a judici-
83. 5 u.s.c. § 706 (2002). 
84. Under Senator Bumpers's legislation, courts would have been required to "inde­
pendently" decide all questions of law, including statutory interpretation questions. See 121 
CONG. REC. 29956-58 (Sept. 24, 1975) (statement of Sen. Bumpers on S. 2408); Regulatory 
Procedures Act of 1981: Hearing on H.R. 746 Before the House Subcomm. on Administrative 
Law and Governmental Relations of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 54-63, 918-20 
(1981). 
85. See Cass R. Sunstein, Congress, Constitutional Moments, and the Cost-Benefit State, 
48 STAN. L. REV. 247, 274-75 (1996) (hereinafter Sunstein, Congress, Constitutional 
Moments, and the Cost-Benefit State] (making this point in the context of different "super­
mandate" proposals in the regulatory arena). 
86. See Elizabeth Garrett, The Impact of Bush v. Gore on Future Democratic Politics, in 
THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRATIC POLITICS: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES 141 ,  
157-58 (G. M. Pomper & M.D. Weiner eds., 2003) (discussing this type of interest-group be­
havior in a different congressional context); Adrian Vermeule, Veil of Ignorance Rules in 
Constitutional Law, 1 1 1  YALE L.J. 399 (2001) (making point generally). 
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ary that proceeds in a case-by-case way.87 Nonetheless, there has been 
some support for the approach in the past; the Bumpers Amendment 
was nearly enacted, passing the Senate unanimously, only a few years 
before the Court decided Chevron.88 
Alternatively, Congress could make the delegation decision with 
respect to each regulatory statute. Not only does this seem unlikely 
given past behavior and institutional limitations, but the approach also 
affects only statutes enacted in the future. For a more comprehensive 
solution, Congress would be required to embark on a parallel effort to 
assess past statutes and decide what guidance is appropriate. Congress 
does not typically undertake retrospective analysis of past regulatory 
statutes, even when it adopts new procedural approaches that will 
apply broadly to future laws.89 Even if lawmakers wanted to review old 
statutes and amend them to include instructions about law­
interpreting authority, the sheer number of regulatory statutes renders 
the task a formidable one. Given limited time and energy, legislators 
would review only a few enactments, leaving the rule with regard to 
the others to courts to determine. 
Although pessimistic conclusions about Congress's ability to 
respond to a general rule of judicial review and delegate clearly are 
understandable, we can expect more from Congress, particularly if its 
attention is brought to a realistic mechanism through which to 
communicate. Such a mechanism could be action forcing, or more 
likely it would be action prompting in that Congress could still avoid 
making an explicit decision, notwithstanding the procedural reform. 
There are promising legislative mechanisms that could be slightly 
reconfigured to make it more likely that Congress was aware of its 
power to vary the rule of judicial review and to empower groups of 
lawmakers who wished to urge consideration and passage of express 
direction. These legislative vehicles represent a middle-ground 
approach between a broad statute along the lines of the Bumpers 
Amendment and a time-consuming statute-by-statute assessment. 
87. See Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, supra note 35, at 1031 (argu­
ing that a Bumpers-amendment approach would be an "overreaction"). 
88. See Farina, supra note 4, at 474-75; see also James T. O'Reilly, Deference Makes a 
Difference: A Study of Impacts of the Bumpers Judicial Review Amendment, 49 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 739 (1980). But see Sunstein, Congress, Constitutional Moments, and the Cost-Benefit 
State, supra note 85, at 251 -53 (observing that such far-reaching statutes are difficult to pass 
in the regulatory context). 
89. See, e.g., Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, 2 U.S.C. § 1501 (2000) (applica­
ble only to new mandates). Although Title III required the Advisory Commission on Inter­
governmental Relations to review unfunded mandates generally, there were no enforcement 
provisions in this title, unlike the provisions affecting new mandates. See also Merrill, The 
Mead Doctrine, supra note 1 1 ,  at 824 ("Congress does not have the time or institutional ca­
pacity to review and amend all existing delegations to agencies to add the appropriate tag 
line to assure the desired allocation of interpretational authority is reached."). 
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Congress currently reviews agencies periodically, every few years 
when it reauthorizes agencies or large programs administered by 
agencies, and annually when it appropriates money to keep the gov­
ernment operating.9° Congress could use these periodically considered 
legislative vehicles to instruct courts and agencies about its decision 
with regard to law-interpreting authority. Provisions in these bills 
could instruct that law-interpreting authority was delegated generally 
to a particular agency, that it was delegated to an agency in all cases 
where particular procedures were used, that it was delegated only with 
respect to certain statutes, or that it was not delegated to the agency at 
all. These bills would allow Congress to resolve the issue in a more 
targeted way than a superstatute would, but it would similarly provide 
a format where the delegation would apply to previously enacted 
statutes within an agency's jurisdiction and to subsequent statutes. 
Three different kinds of legislative vehicles - authorization laws, 
appropriations bills, and omnibus appropri�tions legislation - could 
be used by Congress; however, the formats are not equally well-suited 
to provide an appropriate context for congressional deliberation and 
decisionmaking. First, authorizing legislation is by far the optimal 
vehicle for such provisions. As Allen Schick explains: 
Authorizations represent the exercise of the legislative power ac­
corded to Congress by the Constitution . . . .  In exercising its legislative 
power, Congress can place just about any kind of provision in an authori­
zation. It can prescribe what an agency must or may not do in carrying 
out assigned responsibilities. It can spell out the agency's organizational 
structure and its operating procedures. It can grant an agency broad 
authority or restrict its operating freedom by legislating in great detail.91 
Authorization bills design agencies, and a crucial part of agency design 
is what kind of lawmaking authority, including the power to interpret 
ambiguous language, the agency should receive and how it should 
deploy that power. Again, this type of delegation decision is different 
from the typical one in a regulatory statute: here, Congress is deter-
90. Executive-branch departments and agencies are funded through discretionary 
spending, which means that Congress evaluates the agencies and their funding needs annu­
ally during the appropriations cycle. See Elizabeth Garrett, Rethinking the Structures of De­
cisionmaking in the Federal Budget Process, 35 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 387, 398-400 (1998) (de­
scribing discretionary spending and budget process generally). Some programs administered 
by agencies are not funded through discretionary appropriations but instead receive funding 
through direct spending, which means their funding occurs automatically until Congress 
amends or repeals the underlying statute. Social Security, Medicare, and some transporta­
tion and.agriculture programs are examples of this sort of direct or mandatory spending. Al­
though these programs are not reviewed through the annual appropriations process and may 
not be reviewed periodically through the reauthorization process, they are administered by 
agencies that rely on discretionary funds, so the decisions about law-interpreting authority 
relating to these direct spending programs could be made when agency funding is before 
Congress. 
91. ALLEN SCHICK, THE FEDERAL BUDGET: POLITICS, POLICY, PROCESS 164 (rev. ed. 
2000). 
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mmmg the design of regulatory institutions, not the details of its 
substantive policy instructions. Thus, the decision seems particularly 
well suited to the environment of authorizing bills; the deliberative 
process on the Chevron issue would be enhanced if it occurred during 
a comprehensive evaluation of the agency. 
There are two kinds of authorizing legislation. An organic or 
enabling statute sets up the agency or program; it contains broad 
grants of authority, establishes jobs and duties, and spells out policy 
details. Related legislation authorizes the appropriation of funds for 
particular responsibilities or programs; these laws provide the basis for 
subsequent and separate appropriations bills that actually provide 
funding.92 Since the 1960s, Congress has increasingly used temporary 
authorizations of the second type so that it will have opportunities to 
oversee, reconsider, and change programs on the basis of experience 
and the implementing agency's performance.93 In some cases, events 
have caused Congress to change programs and agencies from perma­
nent authorizations to temporary ones in order to increase oversight. 
Thus, programs like the Safe Drinking Water Act, the Superfund, fed­
eral welfare laws, and the Rural Electrification Loan Restructuring 
program, and agencies like the Department of Justice, NASA, and the 
Securities and Exchange Commission must be reauthorized periodi­
cally. 
One advantage of using the authorization process to consider 
which institution should have primary responsibility to interpret 
regulatory statutes is that it may structure interest-group activity in a 
relatively productive way. In many cases, the key to shaping interest­
group behavior is to construct an environment in which groups can · 
bring forth information that will help lawmakers decide on their 
course of action94 but also an environment that has enough uncertainty 
in it that groups are not entirely sure how any particular decision will 
advance their interests. The latter feature restrains the ability of 
groups to pursue their narrow self-interest, although there must be 
enough information about the future so that policymakers can legis- · 
late with sufficient detail.95 A moderate amount of uncertainty for af­
fected parties is present during the authorization process, which typi­
cally runs on a three-, five-, or even ten-year cycle. When agencies and 
large programs are being designed, or when they are being redesigned 
92. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, UNAUTHORIZED APPROPRIATIONS AND EX­
PIRING AUTHORIZATIONS (APPROPRIATIONS VERSION) 1 -2 (Jan. 2003), available at 
http://www.cbo.gov/Studies&Rpts.cfm. 
93. SCHICK, supra note 91, at 168-70. 
94. For a discussion of the role of interest groups in providing information to policy­
makers, see Elizabeth Garrett, Harnessing Politics: The Dynamics of Offset Requirements in 
the Tax Legislative Process, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 501, 556-61 (1998). 
95. See Vermeule, supra note 86, at 428 (discussing information-neutrality tradeoff). 
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in the reauthorization process, interest groups have some experience 
with the agencies and can anticipate the areas of regulatory emphasis, 
so they will work to influence lawmakers and to provide them with 
relevant information about the agency's performance. At the same 
time, however, interest groups may not be entirely certain of which 
particular issues the agency will place on the top of the regulatory 
agenda in the next few years. Thus, they may not be sure whether they 
will prefer courts or agencies to have the primary responsibility for 
statutory interpretation, a situation that can restrain self-interested 
behavior to some extent. 
In other words, the focus during the authorization, or reauth­
orization, process is more likely to be on broader issues of design, like 
the choice of which institution will wield primary interpretive author­
ity, and not as much on specific issues that have arisen relating to 
particular regulatory decisions. Certainly, some substantive issues will 
be important, and to the extent Congress leaves their resolution to 
courts or agencies by drafting ambiguous or vague statutory language, 
lawmakers and interest groups will be greatly influenced on the insti­
tutional-choice decision by the substance of the issues left open. The 
longer the period of time between reauthorizations, however, the 
more likely the institutional-choice decision will be made for reasons 
other than those related to specific issues. The legislative players 
understand that many more unanticipated issues are likely to be raised 
before the agency over a five-year period than over a two-year period. 
They cannot be entirely sure· which institution is likely to favor the 
outcomes they support when the substance of future decisions is 
uncertain and the composition of the institutions themselves may 
change. A presidential term lasts only four years, and the federal judi­
ciary can shift significantly over a five-year period. If the institutional­
choice decision is nevertheless made primarily with a view to a 
particular, very important substantive issue, it will have consequences 
well past that decision, a factor that will play some role in the design 
decisions. 
To ensure that Congress actually considered the delegation issue 
and reached some decision that was clearly expressed in the legisla­
tion, the legislature could adopt internal ruL:!s mandating that these 
provisions be included in any authorization bill reported out of 
committee. A modern committee report contains a great deal of 
mandatory information, some required by budget rules, some by other 
congressional rules. In the House, for example, each committee report 
contains relevant oversight findings and recommendations, cost esti­
mates, a statement of the constitutional authority supporting enact­
ment of the bill, an estimate of the costs of any federal mandate on 
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state and local governments, and a preemption statement.96 Although 
many rules deal with the content of committee reports, congressional 
rules could encourage lawmakers to place any delegation of law­
interpreting authority in the legislation itself to ensure that courts and 
agencies understood that the instruction has the force of law. 
Internal rules governing the content of legislation and committee 
reports could be enforced in both houses through a point-of-order 
process. Points of order allow members of Congress to object to the 
consideration of laws that violate congressional rules and to force a 
vote of the body before deliberation can proceed. In the Senate, some 
budget points of order are enforced through supermajority voting 
requirements so that a three-fifths vote is mandated to waive the 
objection. In the House, the point-of-order process can be made more 
effective by prohibiting waiver of any such objections in the special 
rule promulgated by the Rules Committee that structures floor delib­
eration. 
The enforcement provisions should be calibrated to ensure that 
Congress would have an opportunity to consider the issue of delegat­
ing law-interpreting authority to agencies while not providing those 
who want to obstruct passage of the underlying bills too great a strate­
gic advantage. In this context, a relatively low level of enforcement is 
required, because the Chevron issue is not especially different from 
other delegation issues that do not receive enhanced protection. Thus, 
the procedure should rely on simple maj ority votes to waive the points 
of order and should require that a group of lawmakers agree to raise 
the objection rather than allowing only one member to stall any bill on 
this ground.97 If this mechanism is envisioned as a procedure that will 
be used only infrequently to vary the application of a consistently 
applied judicial default rule, then the enforcement mechanisms should . 
be even less stringent, requiring a relatively large group of lawmakers 
to trigger them and perhaps allowing waiver in the House by a special 
rule. 
Enforcement would be easier here because interest groups affected 
by regulation would have an incentive to lobby Congress either to 
withhold the authority from agencies or to transfer traditional law­
interpreting power to them from the courts, depending on how they 
expected to fare in a particular forum. Various interest groups would 
96. COMM. ON RULES, U.S. HOUSE OF REPS., A PRIMER ON COMMITIEE REPORTS, at 
http://www.house.gov/rules/comm_rep_primer.htm (last visited Aug. 13 ,  2003). 
97. Currently, congressional points of order can be raised by a single lawmaker unless 
some other procedure has effected a waiver. Rules could be drafted, however, to require 
that several lawmakers formally signal their desire to raise a point of order, much as occurs 
now in the Senate with cloture petitions. See Elizabeth Garrett & Adrian Vermeule, Institu­
tional Design of a Thayerian Congress, 50 DUKE L.J. 1277, 1326-30 (2001) (discussing an en­
forcement mechanism that would require a group of lawmakers to trigger it in the context of 
a proposal for a congressional framework to improve constitutional decisionmaking). 
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be affected differently by the decision, so there would likely be groups 
on both sides of the issue. Scholars who have brought theoretical 
frameworks to bear on the question of whether regulated groups 
generally prefer court interpretation to agency interpretation have 
reached differing conclusions.98 It seems safe to say that interests have 
various objectives, and that their views on the institutional choice 
question will change over time. In addition, study of the process of 
interpretation used by courts and agencies suggests that the two 
different institutions use different methods and assess information like 
legislative history and canons of construction differently.99 Agencies 
may often reach different conclusions than courts about the meaning 
of contested statutory language because their interpretation is neces­
sarily infused with their views of their larger regulatory missions. 
Indeed, different agencies may approach interpretation differently. '00 
These differences in interpretive approach would be relevant to inter­
est groups and lawmakers. Such differences could lead interest groups 
to favor one interpreter or the other in particular circumstances, 
depending on how they expected the different approaches to influence 
substantive outcomes. 
Although sometimes the existence of contending interest groups 
encourages Congress to avoid deciding a matter, leaving it to be 
resolved by courts or agencies,101 a procedural framework can make 
abdication more difficult or change the message of congressional 
silence. For example, once an internal rule required Congress to dele­
gate law-interpreting authority to agencies in particular legislative 
vehicles, failure to make such a delegation might be read by courts as 
a signal for judges to act as primary interpreters of regulatory statutes. 
Groups that prefer agency interpretation would know that they would 
98. Compare Nicholas S. Zeppos, Deference to Political Decisionmakers and the Pre­
ferred Scope of Judicial Review, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 296 (1993) (concluding, after empirical 
analysis, that regulated interests will prefer courts to interpret ambiguous statutory lan­
guage), with Frank H. Easterbrook, The Demand for Judicial Review, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 372 
(1993) (reaching opposite conclusion, based on economic theory and revealed preferences), 
and William N. Eskridge, Jr., The Judicial Review Game, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 382 (1993) 
(same, using positive political theory). 
99. See generally Mashaw, supra note 58 (discussing institutional differences and rec­
ommending different approaches); Peter L. Strauss, When the Judge is Not the Primary Offi­
cial with Responsibility to Read: Agency Interpretation and the Problem of Legislative His­
tory, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 321 (1990) (discussing different institutional capacities and 
incentives with respect to the use of legislative history). 
100. See Mashaw, supra note 58, at 23 (discussing differences between Environmental 
Protection Agency and Department of Health and Human Resources). 
101. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY, & ELIZABETH GARRETT, 
CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC 
POLICY 59 (3d ed. 2001) (relying on work by economists and political scientists to present a 
transactional theory of legislative process that includes this prediction); Peter H. Aranson et 
al., A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1982) (discussing this con­
gressional strategy). 
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be less likely to convince a court to defer and thus have a greater 
incentive than they do today to convince Congress to delegate explic­
itly. Alternatively, if the courts adopted one of the approaches urged 
on them by some scholars and decided to apply a canon consistently 
that requires deference to agencies either whenever statutory text is 
ambiguous or a particular decisionmaking procedure is used, then 
congressional silence would empower agencies. No matter what the 
default rule applied by courts to determine the effect of congressional 
silence, once it is clearly established, interest groups will respond · 
accordingly, focusing their efforts on taking advantage of the action­
prompting mechanism put in place by the internal congressional rule. 
Although authorizing legislation is the best vehicle for directives 
about law-interpreting authority, it would not solve the problem for all 
statutes and all agencies. First, some agencies and programs have 
permanent authorizations so periodic assessment is not institutional­
ized. Nevertheless, Congress could revisit programs and agencies with 
permanent authorizations and amend the statutes, and it might 
be somewhat more likely to do so if the delegation issue were made 
salient by a new congressional process affecting reauthorizations and 
new authorizing legislation. Second, Congress occasionally fails to 
authorize programs to which it nonetheless appropriates money. 
Although internal rules require that programs have current authoriza­
tions before appropriations are in order, Congress can waive these 
rules expressly or implicitly by passing an appropriations law that 
establishes or continues funding for the program or agency. Congres­
sional rules discourage substantive legislation on appropriations bills, 
but such riders are commonplace and have the force of law once en­
acted. 
Accordingly, a second legislative vehicle - appropriations bills -
could be used in some instances where the authorization process was 
unavailable. Any new procedure requiring Congress to delegate law­
interpreting authority expressly should also apply to appropriations 
bills, encouraging explicit statements of delegations for programs that 
are either permanently authorized or not currently authorized. The 
Congressional Budget Office maintains lists of such programs102 so it is 
not difficult to discover when a delegation should occur in an appro­
priations bill. A point-of-order process could be used to enforce the 
rule. 
Using the appropriations process is not the best way to make the 
decision. One of the reasons that legislative riders on appropriations 
bills are discouraged by congressional rule and judicial decision is that 
the deliberation surrounding such bills focuses less on program design 
and more on funding levels. In the frenzy that can accompany spend-
1 02. See, e.g. , CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 92 (required by § 202(e)(3) 
of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act). 
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ing decisions, lawmakers may be less attentive to details of program 
and agency design. The system of dividing authorization bills from 
appropriations measures is supposed to ensure a dual level of over­
sight with the substantive committees shouldering the primary respon­
sibility for institutional design. The delegation of law-interpreting 
authority is more clearly in the competence of the authorizing commit­
tees than in that of the appropriations subcommittees. Furthermore, 
appropriations bills are considered and passed annually, rather than 
every few years, and this frequency is not optimal for decisions about 
law-interpreting authority or other fundamental aspects of regulatory 
design.1 03 
Nonetheless, in the real world of the legislative process, the appro­
priations subcommittees have a great deal of responsibility over 
substantive details of programs and exercise some oversight. Thus, 
they have the expertise to make this decision, at least compared to 
courts. Moreover, if the substantive committees understand that they 
would cede their power to allocate law-interpreting power to other 
legislators should they fail to live up to their responsibility, they would 
have an incentive to provide directives to courts and agencies. If 
Congress provided its directions about law interpretation in an appro­
priations bills through the mechanism proposed here, courts would not 
be justified in applying the traditional canon that construes riders to 
appropriations bills narrowly.104 The procedural mechanism and 
increased scrutiny would ameliorate the concerns about deliberative 
pathologies that undergird the use of the canon in other contexts. 
Of course, just as substantive committees sometimes fail to pass 
authorizing legislation, in some years Congress fails to pass all the 
appropriations bills. In such years, the government is funded either 
through continuing resolutions or, once an overall agreement on 
funding has been reached, through an omnibus appropriations bill.105 
These legislative vehicles are not especially conducive to substantive 
provisions like those delegating law-interpreting authority to agencies, 
although they can contain substantive provisions and riders. They 
provide the least desirable context for Congress to legislate Chevron 
issues because the environment in which they are considered and 
passed makes it very likely that Congress would ignore any action­
prompting mechanism and override any enforcement procedures. 
103. See discussion supra text accompanying notes 94-95. 
104. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY, & ELIZABETH GARRETT, 
LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 172 (2000) (discussing the canon). 
105. Fiscal year 2003 was such a year; Congress did not complete work on eleven of the 
thirteen appropriations bills until February, over four months late. It finally enacted them in 
one large omnibus act. See Carl Hulse, Spending Bill ls Approved, With Its Storehouse of 
Pork, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2003, at A24 (criticizing both the process and the substance of 
the omnibus appropriations bill). Between the end of fiscal year 2002 and passage of the 
omnibus act, the government was funded through a series of continuing resolutions. 
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Thus, I do not recommend extending the procedure to include these 
bills when the other two legislative formats have not produced a clear 
legislative instruction. In years where the appropriations process 
breaks down (which tends to affect only some agencies and programs 
because usually a few of the thirteen appropriations bills are passed) 
and the authorization process is unavailable, previously enacted provi­
sions allocating the authority would remain in effect. If such provisions 
had not been passed or had expired, the courts could proceed in the 
absence of a congressional delegation, interpreting the regulatory 
statute as they interpret other laws and considering agency views as 
persuasive but not controlling authority. Alternatively, if the judiciary 
was convinced that a background default rule of deference to the 
agency was justified on normative grounds, then courts would under­
stand silence to signal congressional acceptance of deference in this 
instance. 
A procedural framework would make this issue of delegation more 
salient to lawmakers, and it would encourage the use of legislative 
vehicles that are regularly considered. The structure of these laws 
would enable Congress to make the proper trade-offs, thinking glob­
ally about agencies' institutional competence, more specifically about 
a particular agency's abilities, and finally about particular statutes and 
programs within the agency's jurisdiction. Although it seems likely 
that Congress would often prefer to delegate this aspect of policy­
making power to agencies, over which it has more influence than it 
does over the independent judiciary, the legislature would likely reach 
the opposite conclusion at least some of the time. Not only would 
some interest groups work to influence the legislature to favor the 
courts in some instances, but in the past Congress has demonstrated a 
preference for courts to act as the primary interpreter of regulatory 
statutes. The Administrative Procedure Act contains such a statement, 
and the Bumpers Amendment, which nearly passed Congress, favored 
courts over agencies in all circumstances. Senator Bumpers justified 
his proposal by arguing that courts would ensure greater fidelity to 
congressional desires, whereas agencies would follow the lead of the 
president or implement their own policy goals notwithstanding 
congressional intent.1 06 Many in Congress are unlikely to share 
Bumpers's preference because they hope to use their power over 
agencies through oversight, appropriations, and jawboning to influ­
ence regulatory outcomes. But the history of legislative action in this 
arena suggests that Congress would sometimes delegate to courts or 
restrict the delegation to agencies, particularly when it would have the 
opportunity to revisit its decision in the future. 
106. See 121  CONG. REC. 29956, 29957 (Sept. 24, 1975) (statement of Sen. Bumpers on 
the introduction of S. 2408). 
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C. Limitations of the Action-Prompting Mechanism and the Need for 
a Continuing Judicial Role 
Although promising, this proposal has some evident limitations. 
First and foremost is the concern that Congress would continue to 
evade its responsibility and avoid express delegations notwithstanding 
the procedural framework. If Congress remains silent even after 
adopting a procedural structure to prompt a decision, courts might be 
justified in taking primary responsibility for interpreting regulatory 
statutes. Under the traditional approach that is tied to congressional 
intent, deference on the basis of delegation would seem inappropriate 
in such circumstances. Adopting such a procedure would signal that 
Congress hoped to provide better directives to courts; therefore, the 
absence of an express delegation would have a different meaning than 
it does now. To put it another way, if the background rule is that 
courts are the primary interpreters of ambiguous statutory text, then 
congressional silence could be taken to mean that Congress had made 
the institutional-choice decision in favor of allowing courts to carry on 
their usual role. 
Alternatively, congressional silence could be understood as a deci­
sion by Congress to let courts determine which institution, courts or 
agencies, should have the primary responsibility to make policy 
through statutory interpretation. In this case, courts might decide, 
perhaps on institutional grounds, to adopt and consistently apply some 
default rule of deference, understanding that the action-prompting 
procedure in Congress would make it more likely that the legislature 
could vary the default when it wanted to. The point here is a general 
one: judicial doctrines should take account of the realities of the leg­
islative process, and legislative process should be reconfigured to 
allow Congress a realistic opportunity to take advantage of opt-out 
provisions in default rules of judicial review, whatever the content. 
Second, the possibility that Congress might allocate law­
interpreting power away from an agency if lawmakers decided the 
agency's performance was unacceptable would increase the influence 
of current Congresses over agencies. This in turn might increase the 
political pressures on agencies, particularly pressures related to 
current political passions. Moreover, it would especially increase the 
influence of the committees responsible for authorization and appro­
priations bills because they would make the initial decision about 
delegating law-interpreting authority.1 07 The full House or Senate 
107. See J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, The Congressional Competition to Control 
Delegated Power, 81 TEXAS L. REV. 1443, 1501-02 (2003) (arguing that oversight techniques 
tend to empower submajorities in Congress that may subvert the objectives of the full body 
as articulated in statutory commands); Molot, supra note 17, at 1291 (noting that "it is far 
from clear that the policy preferences of legislative oversight committees accurately reflect 
the views of the House or Senate as a whole"); Mark Seidenfeld, The Psychology of Ac-
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would be unlikely to revisit the decision in the context of deliberation 
on a lengthy legislative proposal dealing with many aspects of an 
agency or with many funding decisions. Of course, these committees 
already have significant influence over agencies because of their over­
sight activities, their control over agency budgets, and other formal 
and informal tools used to influence administrators.1 08 Agencies 
routinely balance the demands of their competing principals -
Congress and the President - within the structure of the regulatory 
program enacted by yet a third principal, a previous Congress.1 09 While 
my proposal might marginally increase the influence of current law­
makers, particularly those on oversight committees, I do not see it as 
significant enough to profoundly affect current dynamics. 
Third, and relatedly, Congress might · decide how to allocate 
authority between agencies or courts solely on political grounds. For 
example, a Democratic Congress, angry at the policies pursued by the 
Environmental Protection Agency under a conservative Republican 
president, might decide to punish it by instructing courts to pay no 
special attention to agency views on statutory interpretation. Of 
course, this objection is no different from accusations that can be 
leveled at Congress with respect to any delegation of regulatory 
authority. Political considerations are not illegitimate in this realm; 
regulatory policy should be based on a mix of technocratic issues and 
on political perspectives that take account of the wishes of the elector­
ate. Both change over time, · and Congress and the executive branch 
take account of them as they determine regulatory policy. 
It is not clear to me why this context poses a greater risk of inap­
propriate political power plays than other arenas. On the contrary, 
Congress might feel somewhat more constrained here for several 
reasons. First, if lawmakers "punished" agencies by taking away law­
interpreting power, they would allocate that power to judges who 
might be less likely to take account of current congressional prefer­
ences and who would still pay some attention to agency views as an 
extrinsic source of meaning. So the punishment might rebound, leav­
ing Congress reliant on an institution that it influences less effectively 
countability and Political Review of Agency Rules, 51 DUKE L.J. 1059, 1075-82 (2001) (dis­
cussing effect of congressional oversight when the members of oversight committees have 
outlying preferences); see also Mashaw, supra note 58, at 23 (noting that effective agencies 
already take current political developments into account when making regulatory decisions). 
108. See, e.g., JESSICA KORN, THE POWER OF SEPARATION: AMER ICAN 
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE MYTH OF THE LEGISLATIVE VETO (1996) (discussing the 
various methods of influence Congress and committees can bring to bear on agencies and 
the executive branch); see also David 8. Spence, Administrative Law and Agency Policy­
Making: Rethinking the Positive Theory of Political Control, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 407, 432-38 
(1997) (discussing limitations of ex post methods of political control over agencies). 
109. See DAVID EPSTEIN & SHARYN O'HALLORAN, DELEGATING POWERS: A 
TRANSACTION COST POLITICS APPROACH TO POLICY MAKING UNDER SEPARATE POWERS 
151-54 (1999); DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 107. 
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than it does the agency and that often trusts agencies as the reposito­
ries of expertise more than it trusts the legislature. 
Second, the use of the authorization process to make the allocation 
decision would have interesting temporal effects. Reauthorizations 
occur every few years, sometimes every five years or even longer, so 
lawmakers would be aware that if they delegated interpretive power 
to the courts, that decision would likely stay in place for some time, 
perhaps past the term of the president with which Congress disagreed. 
Of course, Congress could revisit its decision at any time, but an 
action-prompting mechanism tied to the reauthorization process is 
necessary because Congress does not often act without some sort 
of prod. Thus, although no decision allocating law-interpreting power 
would be final, it would likely be reassessed in light of changes 
in the political environment only when Congress considered a 
reauthorization proposal. Using authorization legislation for the 
Chevron choice would decrease the chance of severe punishment 
because the decision would have some durability, but any overreaction 
that occurred could be reassessed within a reasonable time and in a 
different political climate. 
Even in cases where Congress delegated law-interpreting authority 
to an agency, courts would have some independent role to play. First, 
courts would determine the scope of the delegation and ensure that 
the agency had not exceeded its authority nor regulated past the juris­
diction Congress granted it.1 1 0  Deference to agency determinations of 
these issues would be inappropriate because agencies are interested 
parties, with incentives in some cases to overreach and in some cases 
to evade responsibility that clearly had been placed on them. The 
court's job would be to determine the scope of the congressional dele­
gation, a task made easier with express congressional directives not to 
second-guess the. agency's decision to regulate particular entities or to 
deal with problems that arguably come within its mandate. The issue 
of whether Chevron deference can be applied to jurisdictional ques­
tions has not been clearly settled by the Court. 1 1 1  In my view, ensuring 
an independent judicial analysis to determine the scope of the delega-
1 10. See, e.g. , Monaghan, supra note 5, at 6 ("Where deference exists, the court must 
specify the boundaries of agency authority, within which the agency is authorized to fashion 
authoritatively part, often a large part, of the meaning of the statute."). 
1 1 1. See Ernest Gellhorn & Paul Verkuil, Controlling Chevron-Based Delegations, 20 
CARDOZO L. REV. 989, 992-93 (1999) (arguing for independent role for judiciary to deter­
mine jurisdictional questions and acknowledging that judicial practice remains unsettled); 
Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, supra note 24, at 446 (arguing that def­
erence to agency is inappropriate in context of question "whether agency jurisdiction ex­
tends to new or unforeseen areas"); Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, supra 
note 2, at 2099 ("The principal reason [for an independent judicial role] is that Congress 
would be unlikely to want agencies to have the authority to decide on the extent of their own 
powers. To accord such power to agencies would be to allow them to be judges in their own 
cause, in which they are of course susceptible to bias."). 
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tion is vital to ensure that a relatively impartial entity determines the 
boundaries of agency authority. 
Applying this limitation would be somewhat problematic, how­
ever. It is sometimes difficult to distinguish between a question that 
concerns the agency's jurisdiction, which would merit independent as­
sessment by the judiciary, and a question of applying delegated 
authority to a borderline case, in which deference to the agency's deci­
sion would be appropriate either when Congress has signaled that 
agency views on the meaning of statutes should be controlling or when 
the judicial default rule understands congressional silence as such 
a delegation. One way to resolve the difficulty is to require an 
independent judicial role only with respect to broad jurisdictional 
issues that either expand agency power substantially or restrict it 
significantly. 1 1 2  
Second, courts should require that agencies provide reasons for 
their decisions to exercise their delegated law-interpreting power in a 
particular way. 1 1 3  Not only are explanations important to promote 
agency accountability and transparency of decisionmaking, but agen­
cies should not be allowed to adopt interpretations of statutes that are 
clearly erroneous. Only by assessing the analysis that supports a par­
ticular interpretation of vague or ambiguous language can the courts 
discharge their duty under the Administrative Procedure Act to reject 
agency action that is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or 
otherwise not in accordance with law."114 As long as the agency has 
acted within the authority delegated to it by Congress, the court 
should accept any reasonable interpretation supported by an explana­
tion, but it would retain a very limited role to play to take care that the 
agency did not act irrationally or unreasonably. Perhaps the best way 
to think about this sort of judicial review is to understand it as a 
method to detect clear mistakes. 1 1 5  
1 12. See Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, supra note 2, at 2100. 
1 13. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Small Things Like Reasons are Put in a Jar: Reason and Le­
gitimacy in the Administrative State, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 17, 26 (2001 ) ("The path of 
American administrative law has been the path of the progressive submission of power to 
reason. The promise of the administrative state was to bring competence to politics."). 
1 14. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2000); see also Magill, supra 
note 34 (discussing similarity of judicial review at Step Two of Chevron and arbitrary-and­
capricious review in other contexts). 
115. The role l envision for the courts here is similar to the role Thayer argued they 
should undertake with regard to constitutional review of congressional action, with the addi­
tional requirement that agencies provide explanations for the interpretations they select. See 
James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 
HARV. L. REV. 129, 144 (1893); see also Monaghan, supra note 5, at 13-14 (discussing 
Thayer's suggestion of judicial review only for clear error and arguing that such a deferential 
standard of review might be consistent with Marbury if one separates the question of the 
existence of judicial review from its scope); Zeppos, supra note 98, at 299 (drawing analogy 
between Chevron deference and Thayerian review). 
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In proposing that courts retain a limited role to police the scope of 
Congress's delegation to agencies, to ensure reasoned explanations, 
and to guard against clear error, I am aware that courts might use any 
grant of power to avoid deferring to agencies and to retain primary 
law-interpreting authority. Particularly in the realm of distinguishing 
jurisdictional questions from other questions, the dividing line is 
blurry, and judgment calls are necessary. Judges could use any excep­
tion as an invitation to push the judicial camel, nose-first, into the 
policymaking tent. But if Congress had expressly directed that agency 
interpretations of statutory language should be "controlling" or oth­
erwise indicated that courts should defer to agencies, deference might 
actually occur more than it does now in the world of judicially con­
structed rules. In practice, Chevron has resulted in less deference than 
one might have expected, and courts routinely find "clear" statutory 
meaning at Step One through the use of canons and other interpretive 
methods. Although judges could still evade congressional directives to 
defer using similar techniques, they might be less likely to do so in the 
face of an explicit congressional directive. Particularly when the doc­
trinal justification for deference rests on congressional delegation, 
even the most aggressive judge might find ignoring a clear directive 
passed pursuant to a procedural framework problematic. Although the 
concern about judicial opportunism is a real one, it seems more prob­
lematic to deny any role to the courts, and such a course might well be 
constitutionally impermissible given Marbury and the structure of 
separated powers. 
Ill. CONCLUSION 
Fundamentally, Marbury v. Madison is a case about allocating 
power among institutions of governance. Thus, as we assess Marbury 
at its bicentennial, we should use it as a springboard to consider the 
relationship among modern governance institutions, which include not 
only Congress and the courts, but also administrative agencies. Under 
current doctrine, informed by Marbury and administrative law prece­
dents like Chevron, the role that agencies play in law interpreting and 
other matters is largely left to Congress to determine when it delegates 
authority to the executive branch. In the absence of clear congres­
sional directives, courts have, in the guise of constructing legislative 
intent, made the decision themselves whether to retain the power 
to interpret statutes or allocate it mainly to agencies by deferring to 
reasonable agency interpretations. Whether the judicial approach is 
couched in terms of congressional intent, or uses some other basis for 
allocating the power to make policy through interpretation, the judi­
cial approaches all envision that Congress has continuing power to 
vary any judicial default rule. 
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Notwithstanding the acceptance of congressional power to over­
ride the judiciary with respect to which institution should interpret 
laws, no one seriously expects Congress to act in most cases. We have 
accepted the courts' predominant role in this area, in part because of 
low expectations with regard to legislative performance. But a proce­
dural framework could be crafted to encourage lawmakers to use 
regularly enacted legislative vehicles to provide clearer guidance to 
courts and agencies regarding their roles with respect to statutory 
interpretation. If, notwithstanding adoption of such a vehicle, 
Congress still failed to provide direction, congressional silence would 
have more meaning, although the meaning would depend on the 
default rule of judicial review adopted by courts. When Congress 
remains mute despite the opportunity to instruct clearly, some would 
argue that the role Marbury envisioned for the judiciary would be ap­
propriate even in the context of regulatory statutes. Or courts might 
adopt and consistently apply a bright-line rule favoring agency inter­
pretation over judicial interpretation, based on technocratic, demo­
cratic, or other institutional considerations. In that case, the action­
prompting congressional procedure would allow Congress a meaning­
ful opportunity to vary such a default. 
My own preference is for the second default rule based on my 
assessment of the institutional considerations. But the point of this 
Article is not to argue in favor of one or the other default rule, but to 
present a proposal that makes more meaningful the aspects of judicial 
review of regulatory statutes that envision a role for Congress. No 
matter what the judicial default rule, the procedural framework 
described here would make the possibility of its application more sali­
ent to Congress, and it would encourage the legislature to consider 
any variance of the default rule in the appropriate context of authori­
zation bills or, when necessary, appropriations bills. Once judicial 
review is situated in the model of a continuing process of interaction 
among courts, Congress, and agencies, we can better understand the 
importance of providing all these groups with the tools they need to 
communicate with and respond to the other branches. 
